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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIANE L. SPANGLER, ] 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
-vs- ] 
MARTIN ALLEN SPANGLER, ] 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
i Case No. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action of divorce brought by Diane L. 
Spangler, Plaintiff and Respondent, against Martin A. Spangler, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon the hearing held in the lower court, the lower 
court granted a judgment of decree of divorce to the Respondent 
making a division of the property of the parties and awarding 
a judgment of child support as against the Appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have this court affirm the decision 
of the trial court and to award the Respondent attorney's fees 
for this appeal. 
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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
The Defendant/Appellant, will hereinafter be re-
ferred to as the "husband," and the Plaintiff/Respondent 
will be referred to as the "wife." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this law suit were married in Ogden, 
Utah on June 1, 1968. They have one child, Shane Alexander 
Spangler, which was born in 1971 and is presently five years 
old. (Record - Page 3, Line 12-16) The wife sought a 
divorce in this case because the husband refused to assume 
any responsibility for supporting her and his son. The 
husband left his wife twice. The first time was from 
December 1972 until the summer of 1973. During this period 
the husband did not contribute any support to his wife or 
son. (R - P . 20, L. 18-31) He also lived with another indi-
vidual. (R - P. 3, L. 31 — P. 4, L. 12) During the last 
period of separation from June of 197 5 until the time of the 
divorce, the husband contributed a total of $225 towards the 
support of his wife and minor child. (R - P. 22, L. 9-15; 
P. 72, L. 5 — P. 74, L. 18) 
The wife, prior to her marriage to the husband, 
owned two pieces of property. One piece of property, here-
inafter referred to as the "Adams property," was purchased 
in April of 1967 for $10,600. The other property, hereinafter 
referred to as the "Liberty property," was assigned to the 
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did make some improvements on the Liberty property. However, 
said improvements were not as extensive as claimed by the 
husband. The husband helped panel the kitchen, repair the 
roof, and put in some carpeting. (R-P. 29, L. 9 — P. 29, 
L. 15) 
In May and June of 1972 both the Adams and Liberty 
properties were sold with total net proceeds from both 
sales in the sum of $12,298.68. This money was invested in 
the purchase of property in Willard, Utah, hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "Willard property." (Plaintiff's Exhibit #1) 
Said property consisted of one acre of land, a home, a brick 
barn, a small cottage and a garage. (Pv - P. 15, L. 8-10) 
$7,000 of said money came directly from the sale of the Adams 
property which was owned by the wife prior to the time she 
married the husband and which contributed a substantial amount 
of income to said marriage in the form of rental income* 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit #1) The Willard property was purchased 
for $28,000 on a contract which required the total purchase 
price to be paid within two years. ( R - P . 15, L. 11-18) 
In December of 197 2, six months after the Willard property 
had been purchased, the husband left the wife and did not 
return until the summer of 1973. The wife testified that 
during this period of time the husband did not contribute 
any money to his wife or child for their support. (R-P. 20, 
L. 18-31) Although the husband claims he sent money home, he 
acknowledges that he does not know the amount, the dates, 
4 
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and does not have any records demonstrating said contribu-
tions. (R - P. 63, L. 31 — P. 71, L. 17-26) > 
In December of 1972, the wife deeded a lot on the 
Willard property to her father with the understanding that 
her father would build a home on the lot for the wife. The 
wife subsequently disposed of all of the Willard property 
with the exception of a cottage and the building lot and 
used the money from that sale to pay off the contract indebt-
edness leaving the cottage and lot unencumbered. (R - P. 15, 
L. 19 — P. 16, L. 31) The wife's father built a home on 
the lot as agreed. The wife mortgaged the property for the 
materials used in building the home in the sum of $7,774 and 
agreed to pay the wife's father $14,400. This $14,400 in-
cludes labor computed at one and one-half times the cost of 
materials amounting to approximately $11,661 and the installa-
tion of a septic tank, water lines and connections, and 
additional materials not included in the mortgage. (R - P. 17, 
L. 3-16; R - P. 18, L. 32 — P. 19 L. 1; and R - P. 43, 
L. 28 - P. 44, L. 4) The husband testified that he did not 
know how much money was owed' to the father for labor on the 
home. (R - P. 67, L. 4-7) The husband also acknowledges 
that the wife had put in over $7,000 into the Willard home 
from property that was hers prior to the marriage. (R - P. 75, 
L. 20-23) 
The husband returned to the wife in the summer of 1973 
and remained until June 197 5. During that period of time 
he did not contribute any money towards the payment of the 
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mortgage on the home, however, he did make some improvements 
on the Willard home. The husband placed a roof on the home, 
built a chain link fence around it, put in some storm windows, 
and poured a driveway. The husband also used a joint income 
tax return to purchase carpet for the home* (R -. P. 30, L. 28 
P. 32, L. 18) During this period of time, the husband lived 
in the home without any contribution except the improvements 
mentioned above. 
The home and the cottage which constituted the 
Willard property was appraised at $33,000. (Defendant's 
Exhibit #5) The court found that of the $12,000 received 
for the two pieces of property owned by the wife prior to 
the marriage, $7,000 could be traced, and that that value 
should remain in the plaintiff. The court also found that 
the wife's father had a claim against the home in the sum 
of $14,400 and that a mortgage had been incurred on the home 
to pay for materials in.the sum of $7,774 leaving an 
approximate equity in the sum of $3,000 which was to be 
divided equally between the parties. (R - P. 80, L. 5-23— 
P. 83, L. 9 — P. 84, L. 23) 
The wife waived her rights to alimony and testified 
that she needed $200 per month child support and that $121 
of said sum was needed for the purposes of keeping the child 
in a day care center while the wife worked. (R - 24, L. 3-15) 
The husband testifed that he v/as willing to pay $121 per month 
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child support to offset the cost of the day care for his 
child. (R - P. 70, L. 17-28) The husband testified he 
was unemployed and claimed that he suffered injuries on 
the job in 1974 which prevents him from working in the 
steel business. However, while the husband did receive 
Workman's Compensation he was never awarded any permanent 
disability or given a disability rating by reason of the 
alleged injury. (R - P. 76, L. 32 — P. 77, L. 2) The 
husband acknowledges that he has a high school education, 
has worked as a steel worker, a barber, and as a carpenter. 
(R - P. 56, L. 4-23) The husband also says he is an in-
ventor and has made approximately $15,000 on his inventions. 
(R- P. 51, L. 32) The husband acknowledges that the only 
efforts he has made to find employment is to contact various 
places in Salt Lake City for a job as a barber. (R - P. 76, 
L. 2-8) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The husband, in his brief, cites Utah cases to 
support his allegation that the trial court's distribution 
of assets was an abuse of discretion. He attempts, by the 
use of those cases, to establish that a distribution of 
marital assets with one-third to the spouse and two-thirds 
to the husband is an accepted practice in the State of Utah 
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and is fair and equitable. The husband cites two cases to 
support this proposition. One is Wooley vs. Wooley, 113, 
Utah 391, 195 P.2d 743 (1948) and the other is Anderson vs. 
Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 286, 422 P.2d 192 (1967). While both 
of those cases affirm a trial court decision granting one-
third to the wife and two-thirds to the husband, they do not 
stand for the proposition that this is a standard that applies 
in all cases. The position of the court is clearly set out 
in the following statement taken from the Anderson case: 
The court frequently emphasizes that "no 
firm rule can be uniformly applied in all 
divorce cases, . . . each must be determined 
upon the basis of the immediate fact situation. 
. . . Recent pronouncements of this court, and 
the policy to which we adhere, are to the effect 
that the trial judge has considerable latitude 
of discretion in such matters and that his 
judgment should not be changed lightly, and 
in fact, not at all, unless it works such a 
manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate 
a clear abuse of discretion." 
The extent of this discretion is emphasized 
by the great disparity of results allowed in 
differing factual situations. . • . 
A similiar statement of lav/ was made by the court 
in the case of Searle vs. Searle, Utah, 522 P.2d 697 (1974). 
The court in that case stated: 
Although it is both the duty and prero-
gative of this court in a case of equity to 
review the facts as well as the law, Article 
VIII, Section 9, Constitution of Utah, the 
trial judge has considerable latitude of dis-
cretion in adjusting the financial and property 
interests in a divorce case. The actions of 
the trial court are indulged with a presumption 
of validity, and the burden is upon appellant 
to prove such a serious inequity as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion. There is no fixed 
8 
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rule or formula for the division of property; 
Section 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, provides that 
when a decree of divorce is made the court 
may make such orders in relation to property 
as may be equitable. The trial court has a 
responsibility to endeavor to provide a just 
and equitable adjustment of their economic 
resources so that the parties might recon-
struct their lives on a happy and useful basis* 
This court held in the Stone vs. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 
378, 431 P.2d 802 (1967) that the court would review the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings of the 
trial court and would not disturb said findings just because 
it might view the matter differently. 
It is the position of the wife that the evidence 
should be viewed in the light most favorable to her and that 
the husband has failed to prove that such a serious inequity 
existed in the decision of the trial court as to overcome 
the presumption of validity and to manifest a clear abuse 
of discretion. 
The husband in his argument acknowledges that one 
of the items to be considered by a court in making a property 
distribution is the fault of the parties involved. The 
husband implies in his argument that he is without fault in 
this divorce. Such an implication is totally unsupported by 
the evidence. The evidence presented in the trial court did 
not demonstrate any grounds for divorce on the part of the 
husband. A divorce was granted to the wife because the 
husband refused to assume any responsibility for the support 
of his wife and his son and because the husband had left the 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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wife on two occasions and during one of these periods had 
been living with another individual. If the husband is 
maintaining that fault should be taken into consideration by 
the court, then he would have to concede that the wife should 
be entitled to a greater portion of the assets because of 
the fault on the part of the husband• 
The husband claims that a 50 percent division of 
the real property should be made because of the contributions 
made by the husband during the time he was married. It is 
the position of the wife that the court in fact did make a 
50 percent distribution of the real property. However, the 
wife does not concede that the husband made any substantial 
contributions towards the real property which v/as accumulated 
during the marriage. The wife owned the Adam's property 
prior to the time she married the husband. The Liberty pro-
perty was transferred to the wife prior to her marriage to the 
husband to compensate the wife for secretarial services she 
had rendered for the husband and for four months rent which 
the husband had not paid. These two pieces of property were 
sold and the $12,298 received therefrom was invested in the 
Willard property. After the husband had deserted her the 
wife, with the help of her father, sold part of the Willard 
property and built a home in which to live. 
The husband now claims that he is entitled to part 
of the Willard. property even though the property was pur-
chased entirely with the wife's assets and built through the 
efforts of the wife and her father without any assistance 
10 
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from the husband. The husband did make some improvements 
on the home but also lived in the home from 1973 until 1975, 
when he again deserted his wife without contributing any 
substantial amount to her support. It is difficult to 
understand how the husband can claim that the wife should 
support herself, her minor child, acquire property, build a 
home and then be obligated to divide the equity in that 
home with the husband who had neglected his family responsi-
bilities. 
The husband's major contention is that the trial 
court made an error in determining the amount of outstanding 
obligations against the property owned by the parties at the 
time of the divorce. The trial court determined that the 
Willard property had an outstanding indebtedness against it 
in the sum of $7,774 v/hich represented a mortgage and $14,4 00 
which constituted an obligation owed to the wife's father 
for the construction of the home. The,court determined 
that an additional $7,000 could be traced from the approxi-
mately $12,000 of property owned by the wife prior to the 
time she married the husband. Consequently, the court held 
that there was approximately $3,000 worth of equity remaining 
in the home and ordered that the husband receive a lien for 
$1,500 of said sum. 
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, the husband 
acknowledged that the wife had put in over $7,000 into the 
Willard property which could be traced from assets belonging 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the wife prior to their marriage. The husband, in his 
brief, does not allege that the court was incorrect in 
allowing the v/ife to trace assets that she possessed prior 
to her marriage. This court has held that a trial court 
has broad discretion in dealing with property belonging to 
the parties and has recognized the tracing of separate 
property in determining a property distribution. 
The husband contends that the obligation owed to 
the wife's father is $11,661 rather than $14,400 as found 
by the court. The husband's attorney, Mr. Vlahos, asked 
the wife on cross examination the basis of the agreement 
to compensate the father for his labor. The wife testified 
that the basic agreement was one and one-half times the 
cost of materials but denied that the sum owed was $11,6 61. 
In response to Mr. Vlahos' cross examination the wife 
stated as follows: 
MR. VLAHOS: I'm asking her if, based on 
her agreement with her father, $11,6 61 would 
not be the correct figure you would owe your 
father. 
A: No. 
Q: Did you have some sort of other agree-
ment to raise it up to $14,400? 
A: Well, yeah. He put in a septice tank 
and a number of materials that he didn't charge 
me for, that isn't on this mortgage, and that's 
what we were basing our figures on. (R - P. 43, 
L. 28 — P. 44, L. 4) 
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The husband testified that he had no knowledge of how much 
was owed to the father for the labor on the home. Therefore, 
the only evidence presented before the court was to the 
effect that the obligation for labor on the home amounted to 
$14,400. The court accepted this figure and based its deci-
sion on it. The husband by attacking the court's decision 
on the distribution of real property is asking this court to 
accept the $11,661 figure as being accurate when it is not 
supported by the evidence and the trial court found that was 
not the correct sum. 
The husband apparently claims that the court's 
award of child support in the sum of $75 per month while the 
husband is unemployed and $135 per month when the husband 
earns $4 0 0 or more is unequitable and an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion. The husband alleges that the wife is 
a competent individual and that the husband is not and, 
consequently, he should not be required to pay the child support 
as prescribed by the court. The evidence presented before 
the court indicates that the husband has a high school 
education, has worked as a steel worker, a barber and as a 
carpenter. He is also an inventor. The husband stated in 
his testimony that he was willing to pay $121 per month as 
child support. The husband has no obligation to pay any 
bills incurred during the marriage and does not have to 
pay alimony. There is no evidence which demonstrates that 
the husband is unable to meet the child support as ordered 
by the court. 
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POINT II 
THE WIFE SHOULD BE GRANTED COST AND A REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR THIS APPEAL. 
The wife contends that the appeal of the husband 
is unfounded and without merit. Consequently, the wife prays 
that the court grant her reasonable attorney's fees plus cost 
of court incurred in this appeal. Section 30-3-3 U.C.A. pro-
vides that the court can award attorney's fees and this court 
has held that a reasonable attorney's fee may be awarded on 
appeal. See Anderson vs. Anderson, 13 Utah P.2d 36, 368 
P.2d 264; Hendricks vs. Hendricks, 91 Utah, 564, 65 P.2d 642; 
and Peterson vs. Peterson, 112 Utah 542, 189 P.2d 961. 
CONCLUSION 
The wife contends that the evidence presented before 
the trial court supports it's determination that the equity 
in the Willard property was $3,000 and the trial court's 
division of the marital property. The wife also contends 
that the husband is financially capable of paying child 
support and attorney's fees as awarded by the trial court. 
WHEREFORE, the wife respectfully requests that this 
court affirm the decision of the trial court and award the 
wife attorney's fees and costs of court for this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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